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Abstract
Web services provide platform independent communication 
through an XML-based standard family. The major software 
vendors released their own SOA products implementing these 
standards. However, the configuration of the WS-* protocols 
differs from product to product. Matching these configurations 
between different products can be a tedious task. In addition, 
security protocols are complicated to configure, especially if 
access control is also required. Although the XACML standard 
aims to solve this problem, its rules and policies described in 
XML are not user friendly, and XACML has little support in the 
major SOA products. Therefore, we have developed a platform 
independent metamodel for describing distributed systems of 
web services. From models described in this metamodel the 
platform specific configurations and program code can be gen-
erated for the various SOA products, increasing the productiv-
ity of the development. This article introduces an access con-
trol extension to this metamodel.
Keywords
web services · WS-* standards · SAML · claims-based identity 
· metamodeling
1 Introduction
Web services realize distributed communication in a platform 
independent way by building the related standards on XML. 
The communication protocol (SOAP), the interface descrip-
tion language (WSDL) and the middleware aspects, called 
WS-* standards (WS-Addressing, WS-ReliableMessaging, 
WS-Security, WS-SecureConversation), are all represented in 
XML. These middleware aspects can also be configured in a 
platform independent way through XML chunks called WS-
Policy assertions which are usually included in the WSDL. 
The primary aim using XML for communication is to promote 
interoperability between different platforms.
However, the major drawback of the WS-Policy standard 
family is that the policy assertions of the WS-* standards can 
be large XML structures which makes policy assertions nearly 
impossible to be handwritten by humans. Luckily, most SOA 
products provide policy repositories (e.g. Oracle SOA Suite, 
IBM WebSphere) containing complete assertions that can 
be used for configuration. However, these assertions may be 
diverse in different products and matching them can be a dif-
ficult task. There are also products which offer GUI design-
ers (e.g. GlassFish ESB) or transform WS-Policy assertions 
into their own configuration representation (e.g. Apache CXF, 
Microsoft WCF) making interoperability more problematic.
Most issues arise with the configuration of security protocols, 
especially security tokens and security token services, since 
they require a lot of parameters, like certificates, encryption and 
digital signature algorithms. The XACML (eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language) standard is designed for defining 
policies and rules for authorization decisions. It provides Atti-
bute-Based Access Control (ABAC) in a platform independent 
way. However, since it is also based on XML, it is not conveni-
ent to write XACML policies by hand. Another problem with 
XACML is that it is not yet widespread. For example, Microsoft 
WCF does not yet support it and most open-source implementa-
tions rely on the old Sun XACML library.
It is still an open issue [9] to create a general access control 
metamodel that can unite all the access control approaches, like 
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role-based access control (RBAC) and attribute/claims-based 
access control (ABAC/CBAC). Although, it may be possible 
to construct such a metamodel [2], our goal is not to find the 
ultimate solution for this problem. Our intention is to define a 
metamodel for describing the access control of web services 
with the aim of reducing the development complexity of web 
services with security aspects.
The considerations above inspired us to create a platform 
independent metamodel for describing distributed systems 
built from web services and also a platform independent pro-
gramming language for configuring such distributed systems. 
There are propositions to use of UML for this task [5, 11], but 
UML itself is not suitable, since it lacks most of the concepts of 
the WS-* standard family even when it is extended with stereo-
types [6, 7, 22]. However, a domain specific language designed 
particularly for web services can be more convenient to use and 
can increase productivity. Therefore, we created such a meta-
model, called SoaMM (SOA Metamodel). It also has a textual 
concrete syntax called SOAL (SOA Language), which is a 
programming language for describing distributed systems of 
web services. We also wrote a compiler that transforms SOAL 
descriptions into models (instances of the SoaMM metamodel), 
and also a code generator that produces program code and plat-
form specific configuration files for the various SOA products 
to implement the described system. The produced artefacts 
provide consistent configurations between the different SOA 
products resulting in interoperable applications.
In previous conference proceedings we published [24, 25] 
some parts of this metamodel. The present article introduces 
an extension to this metamodel that provides attribute-based 
access control. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
The second section covers the related work in modeling access 
control for web services. The third section contains the descrip-
tion of the SoaMM metamodel with the access control exten-
sion. The fourth section shows an example how easily the pro-
posed metamodel and programming language can be used to 
implement a WS-Federation scenario, which is usually a com-
plicated task. The fifth section evaluates the productivity of our 
framework through some examples. The last section concludes 
the article and lists the possible future directions.
2 Related Work
The XACML specification [21] contains a metamodel for 
the access control policies and rules. However, this metamodel 
does not deal with web services and with the WS-* protocols, 
and the concrete syntax of XACML is a complex XML struc-
ture, which is hard to maintain by hand.
C. Emig et. al. [8] defined a policy model called Web Service 
Access Control Markup Language (WSACML). The concepts 
in their model are similar to XACML, however, their model 
is more specific for web services. Their solution is a combina-
tion of RBAC and ABAC. Unfortunately, they chose XML as a 
concrete syntax for the model, which is harder to maintain than 
a code written in a domain specific language. It is unclear from 
the paper, what kind of expressions can be defined in the model, 
and they do not take other WS-* protocols into consideration.
M. Alam et. al. [1, 12] created the SECTET framework for 
model driven security. They incorporated all the XACML v3.0 
concepts into their framework and they are able to generate 
XACML policies from the models. They use UML as a visual 
model and OCL for defining access control conditions. How-
ever, they define authorization for roles instead of the more 
general ABAC solution, and they do not consider other WS-* 
protocols in their model.
T. Mouelhi et. al. [20] proposed a model-driven approach 
for specifying, deploying and testing security policies in Java 
applications. It is based on a generic security meta-model 
which can be used for early consistency checks in the secu-
rity policy. This model is then automatically transformed into 
security policy for the XACML platform and integrated in the 
application using aspect-oriented programming. However, they 
also build on RBAC, and they do not cover web services.
M. Giordano et. al. [10] proposed a visual language to spec-
ify access and security policies according to the RBAC model. 
They also point out the complexity of XACML, and they show 
how XACML policies can be generated from their visual lan-
guage. Unfortunately, they do not deal with the more general 
claims-based access control model and with web services.
X. Jin [15] created an MDA approach to model RBAC sys-
tems. This approach uses UML with stereotype extensions 
as a visual language for defining models. The access control 
rules can be described in OCL. However, this solution is also 
restricted to RBAC, and it does not deal with web services.
M.E. Jiague et. al. [14] specified a platform independent 
model, a platform specific model and translation rules between 
them to generate BPEL processes for authorization decisions. 
Unfortunately, their model is too high-level, and it is unclear 
what kind of expressions can be used for defining the authori-
zation conditions.
C. Wolter et. al. [31] proposed to model certain types of 
security goals in a graphical fashion at the business process 
modeling level, which in turn can be transformed into corre-
sponding access control and security policies. This is a promis-
ing approach, since defining access control in a graphical way 
is more intuitive than maintaining XML files. However, their 
solution is too high-level, and most of the generated configura-
tion options cannot be parameterized graphically. For example, 
the parameters of the WS-Security protocol cannot be specified 
graphically.
Another way of describing services is using semantic web tech-
nologies. The major goal of Semantic Web Services (SWS) is to 
create intelligent software agents to provde automated, interoper-
able and meaningful coordination of web services [16]. The three 
main directions of SWS are SAWSDL, OWL-S and WSMO.
95A Platform Independent Access Control Metamodel for Web Services 2014 58 3
SAWSDL [30] does not introduce a new language. It is a 
WSDL extension for referencing ontological concepts outside 
WSDL documents. Beyond that it does not define any execu-
tion semantics for the implementation.
The OWL-S [29] profile ontology is used to describe what a 
service does, and is meant to be mainly used for the purpose of 
service discovery. The service description contains input and 
output parameters, pre- and post-conditions, and also non-func-
tional aspects. The OWL-S process model describes service 
composition including the communication pattern. In order 
to connect OWL-S to existing web service standards, OWL-S 
uses grounding to map service descriptions to WSDL. The 
OWL-S environment provides an editor to develop semantic 
web services and a matcher to discover services. The OWL-S 
Virtual Machine is a general purpose web service client for 
the invocation. OWL-S therefore requires a custom execution 
environment and cannot be used in current commercial SOA 
products. Its underlying description logic OWL-DL has also a 
limited expressiveness in practice.
The WSMO [32] framework provides a conceptual model 
and a formal language WSML for semantic markup of web ser-
vices. WSMO is used for modeling of ontologies, goals, web 
services and mediators. Ontologies provide formal logic-based 
grounding of information used by other components. Goals rep-
resent user desires, that is the objectives that a client might have 
when searching for services. Web services are computational 
entities, their semantic description includes functional and 
non-functional properties, as well as their capabilities through 
pre- and post conditions, assumptions and effects. Mediators 
provide interoperability between components at data, protocol 
and process level. The reference implementation of WSMO is 
the WSMX [13] framework, a custom execution environment. 
It is designed to allow dynamic discovery, invocation and com-
position of web services. It also provides interoperability with 
classical web services.
The main design goals of SWS standards are discovery, invo-
cation and composition of web services. These standards are 
not primarily designed for modeling purposes. They are weak 
in terms of security, transactional, reliability and other non-
functional aspects even at the conceptual level [23]. Because of 
their custom execution environment, their implementations do 
not rely on existing SOA products of major software vendors, 
which can result in interoperability problems with classical 
web services published by these products.
Although there are directions to extend SWS standards with 
WS-Policy concepts [17, 27, 28], these solutions focus on ser-
vice discovery and policy matching, and do not resolve the 
issues related to modeling and implementation.
T.-Y. Chen [4] developed a knowledge access control policy 
(KACP) language model for virtual enterprises. It is an ontol-
ogy-based access control approach. Its drawback is that poli-
cies written in the proposed KACP language model are difficult 
to read and analyze, it only describes concepts, it does not deal 
with web services and WS-* protocols, and the textual concrete 
representation is also XML, which is hard to maintain.
A domain specific model designed particularly for web ser-
vices with a friendly concrete syntax is easy to understand, 
more convenient to use and is more productive for web service 
development than the solutions listed above. We considered 
extending one of the existing solutions to match these require-
ments. Solutions with UML and OCL, and the ones with ontol-
ogies are inconvenient for the web service domain, especially 
for configuring WS-* policies. Solutions that implement only 
RBAC are too restricted, and their metamodel and concrete 
syntax require a lot of modification for ABAC and WS-* policy 
support. The remaining domain-specific solutions have XML 
as a concrete syntax, which is inconvenient to edit by humans. 
XACML, which is the most widely adopted solution of these, 
suffers from this problem, too. Other solutions do not have a 
significant user base, and the amount of work to extend them is 
comparable to creating a new framework from scratch. There-
fore, we decided to choose the latter. Our target users are the 
developers who use the SOA products of major software ven-
dors. Our framework does not replace these products, it simply 
helps these developers with the top-down development of web 
services by increasing their productivity.
Our solution concentrates on the more general ABAC 
approach. It has a domain specific metamodel and a simple 
textual concrete syntax. This syntax is easier to maintain than 
a verbose XML description. Another advantage of our frame-
work is that it also supports other WS-* protocols.
3 Access Control Metamodel for Web Services
Since almost every web service framework uses a different 
kind of configuration format it is hard to match the options of 
the different frameworks. This is the reason why we decided to 
create a common metamodel for the WS-* standard family in 
order to be able to model the services in a platform independent 
way. From this model the platform dependent configurations of 
the various frameworks can be automatically generated.
This section specifies the SoaMM metamodel which can be 
used for modeling access control for distributed services in a 
platform independent way. Some parts of the metamodel have 
already been published [24, 25]. Since the focus of this article 
is the access control aspect, the other aspects of the metamodel 
are not discussed here.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the SoaMM metamodel. 
Most of the WSDL parts are mapped to the SoaMM metamodel. 
The only exception is the message part which is a redundant 
element in the WSDL description, therefore, it is omitted from 
the SoaMM metamodel. All the other parts (types, portType, 
bindings and endpoints) are included in SoaMM and there is 
an additional declaration for modeling claims to support claims 
based identity. Bindings define the transport, the encoding and 
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the WS-* protocols to be used. The supported protocols are WS-
Addressing, WS-ReliableMessaging, WS-Security, WS-Secure-
Conversation, WS-AtomicTransaction. The remaining parts of 
this section show how the elements in Figure 1 related to access 
control modeling are defined in the SoaMM metamodel.
There is also a simple programming language called SOAL 
which provides a textual concrete syntax for the SoaMM meta-
model. This language has a similar syntax to C# and Java, but 
it is specific to the SoaMM domain.
Figure 2 shows the possible declaration elements of SoaMM. 
SoaMM supports namespaces to avoid name collisions. 
Namespaces can be hierarchical, therefore, a Namespace can 
contain other Namespace declarations. A Type is a simple 
or complex type which constraints the values represented by 
variables. The Claims element is a list of claim definitions 
used in claims based identity management. These claims can 
be mapped to SAML attributes and WS-Feredation claims. 
An interface is a collection of operations provided by a ser-
vice, and it is described by the Interface element (this is 
the portType element in the WSDL). Middleware aspects and 
protocol configurations are specified in the Binding element. 
The Endpoint element represents a service running on a spe-
cific location (this is the service element in the WSDL). The 
Authorization element defines a contract for access con-
trol for web services.
The SoaMM modeling language has a strong type sys-
tem shown in Figure 3. A type can be either a simple type 
(SimpleType), a wrapper type (WrapperType) or a com-
plex type (ComplexType). Simple types are either built-in 
types (BuiltInType) commonly used in most program-
ming languages (int, double, string, etc.) or enumeration types 
(EnumType) with a fixed set of values (EnumValue). Wrap-
per types are constructed from primitive types by adding some 
new behavior. Such a wrapper type is the array type (Array-
Type) that represents an array of values and the nullable type 
(NullableType) that extends the codomain of non-null 
simple types with null values. More complex types can be 
constructed from other types using structured types (Struct-
Type). Structured types also support single inheritance from 
other structured types. An exception type (ExceptionType) 
is similar to a structured type, however, its semantics is differ-
ent: it represents a fault in SOAP and an exception in conven-
tional programming languages.
One of the main advantages of SoaMM is that claims based 
identity management is built into the metamodel in a plat-
form- and standard independent way. This means that claims 
(Claims) are first class types in the type system. A claim 
(Claim) has a name, a uri and a type. These claims can be 
mapped to WS-Federation claims and also to SAML attributes.
The interfaces (Interface) of the services are described as a 
set of operations (Operation). Figure 4 shows the metamodel 
of interface declarations. Interfaces support multiple inheritance. 
An operation can have zero or more input parameters (Parame-
ter) and a return type (returnType). If the oneway property 
types
interfaces transport
namespaces
WS-Addressing
claims
bindings
endpoints
encoding
protocols
WS-ReliableMessaging
WS-Security
WS-SecureConversation
WS-AtomicTransaction
authorizations
Fig. 1. Architecture of the SoaMM metamodel
Declaration
gnirts : eman -
Namespace
gnirts : iru - Type Interface
Binding EndpointClaims
Authorization
declarations
namespace
0..*
0..1
Fig. 2. Namespaces and declarations
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is true, the operation follows the one-way message exchange pat-
tern, otherwise it is a request-response operation. One-way opera-
tions must have a void return type and cannot throw exceptions 
(SOAP faults). Request-response operations can throw excep-
tions. The possible exception types must be explicitly listed for 
the operation, just like checked exceptions in Java.
An endpoint implementing a specific interface (Interface) 
with a specificbinding (Binding) running on a specific location 
is represented by the Endpoint element (Figure 5). An endpoint 
contains the address of the web service and may also specify a 
metadata address, where additional information about the web 
service may be accessed using the WS-MetadataExchange stand-
ard. An endpoint may have an Authorization element which 
defines the contract for access control of the given endpoint.
A binding (Binding) declaration defines through what pro-
tocols a service can be accessed. It contains the list of the ena-
bled protocols in the stack. The protocols are represented by 
binding elements (BindingElement). A binding has exactly 
one transport protocol (TransportBindingElement), 
exactly one encoding protocol (EncodingBinding-
Element) and zero or more WS-* protocols (Protocol-
BindingElement). The SoaMM metamodel currently sup-
ports the most common HTTP and HTTPS transport protocols, 
and SOAP as the encoding protocol.
Figure 6 shows the higher level middleware protocols. 
WsAddressingProtocol denotes the settings of the WS-
Addressing protocol. The metamodel also supports WS-Relia-
bleMessaging and WS-AtomicTransaction, see [25].
The most complicated protocols to configure are the secu-
rity protocols (WsSecurityProtocol). The SoaMM meta-
model makes this task a bit easier. At first, the version numbers 
for the security protocols must be specified: the WS-Security 
version, the WS-SecurityPolicy version and the WS-Trust ver-
sion. These are represented in the metamodel by WssVersion, 
WssSpVersion and WssTrustVersion, respectively 
(see Figure 6). After this, the security algorithm suite, the layout 
of the SOAP headers and the protection order of the message 
elements must be selected. These are represented by WssAl-
gorithmSuite, WssHeaderLayout and WssProtec-
tionOrder, respectively (see Figure 7). The security elements 
shown in this Figure are common to all security protocols.
The various security protocols differ in the security tokens 
that are exchanged between the parties. At first, it must be 
decided, whether the client and the server will use the same kind 
of tokens or they will use different ones. If both participants use 
Fig. 3. Types and claims
Fig. 4. Interface
Declaration
Type Interface
Operation
gnirts : eman -
naeloob : yaweno -
Parameter
gnirts : eman -
ExceptionType
returnType
operations
parameters
interface
exceptions
superInterfaces
type
0..*
1
0..*
0..*
0..*
1
1
Type Field
gnirts : eman -
SimpleType ComplexType
EnumTypeBuiltInType ArrayType StructType
ExceptionType
EnumValue
gnirts : eman -
Claim
gnirts : eman -
gnirts : iru -
Claims
Declaration
«enum»
BuiltInTypeKind
looB +
etyB +
tnI +
gnoL +
taolF +
elbuoD +
gnirtS +
diuG +
etaD +
emiT +
emiTetaD +
napSemiT +
tcejbO +
dioV +
NullableType
WrapperType
superType
values
type
type
claims
superType
kind
fields
innerType
0..1
1
1
1
0..*
0..*
0..1
1
0..*
   
  
98 Per. Pol. Elec. Eng. and Comp. Sci. Balázs Simon / Balázs Goldschmidt / Károly Kondorosi
ProtocolBindingElement
WsSecurityProtocol
naeloob : pmatsemiTedulcni -
naeloob : noitamrifnoCerutangiSeriuqer -
«enum»
WssHeaderLayout
tcirtS +
xaL +
tsriFpmatsemiTxaL +
tsaLpmatsemiTxaL +
«enum»
WssAlgorithmSuite
821cisaB +
291cisaB +
652cisaB +
seDelpirT +
51asR821cisaB +
51asR291cisaB +
51asR652cisaB +
51asRseDelpirT +
652ahS821cisaB +
652ahS291cisaB +
652ahS652cisaB +
652ahSseDelpirT +
51asR652ahS821cisaB +
51asR652ahS291cisaB +
51asR652ahS652cisaB +
51asR652ahSseDelpirT +
«enum»
WssProtectionOrder
ngiSerofeBtpyrcnE +
tpyrcnEerofeBngiS +
erutangiStpyrcnEdnAtpyrcnEerofeBngiS +
WssToken
headerLayout
protectionOrder
algorithmSuite
tokensclientTokens
serverTokens
1
0..*0..*
0..*
1
1
Fig. 7. Security
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Fig. 5. Endpoint and Binding
the same kind of tokens, the security configuration is easier, 
and only the tokens attribute has to be specified. If the par-
ticipants use different kind of tokens, then the client side and 
the server side tokens must be configured through the cli-
entTokens and the serverTokens respectively.
There are multiple possible choices for selecting the secu-
rity tokens (see Figure 8). The SoaMM metamodel supports 
username tokens, X.509. certificate tokens, issued tokens, 
SAML tokens and secure conversation tokens. In this arti-
cle only WssX509Token and WssSamlToken are shown. 
Through the tokenInclusion it can also be specified when 
the different tokens should be included during the commu-
nication between the client and the service: always, once or 
never. The tokens WssIssuedToken and WssSamlToken 
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are issued by a security token service (STS). In these cases 
the endpoint of this STS should also be specified through the 
tokenIssuer.
An X.509. certificate token contains an X.509. certificate or 
a reference to such a certificate. In this case only the version of 
the token must be specified.
A SAML token contains claims based SAML assertions issued 
by a security token service. In this case the SAML version, the 
required claims and the token issuer have to be specified.
An authorization contract (Authorization) specifies the 
access rights for the operations of a service interface (see Fig-
ure 9). Each service operation (Operation) is implemented 
by an authorization operation (AuthorizationOpera-
tion) that contains authorization statements (Authoriza-
tionStatement). An authorization statement either permits 
or denies access to the service operation, depending on the 
result of the boolean expression attached to it.
The metamodel for expressions in SoaMM is shown in Figure 
10. It is similar to the expressions in .NET [18]. The advantage 
of this metamodel is that it is independent of the different pro-
gramming languages, hence, models conforming to this meta-
model can be translated to C# and Java, too. An expression tree 
contains nodes. A node in the expression tree may be an instance 
of one of the following meta-classes shown in Figure 10 and 
explained in Table 1.
The methods that can be used on built-in types are the same 
as the .NET methods on the same .NET types, including the 
extension methods of the IEnumberable interface [19].
4 Example
In general, the security protocols have the most complicated 
configuration, especially if security token services are also 
involved. It is even harder to set the appropriate properties if 
different products from different vendors are used. This section 
shows an example how easy it is to configure a scenario with a 
security token service (STS) using the proposed SoaMM meta-
model and its textual concrete syntax called SOAL.
The example is based on the sample introduced in [3]. The 
scenario (see Figure 11) is the following. A client would like 
to buy wine from a webshop. In order to be allowed to do 
this, he must prove that he is an adult. The proof is presented 
as a SAML security token issued by a trusted third party, the 
security token service (STS). The client authenticates itself 
at the STS with his X.509. certificate and receives a SAML 
token containing his birth date signed by the STS. The webshop 
checks the birthdate in the SAML token and decides whether to 
allow the transaction or not.
Fig. 8. Security tokens
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Fig. 9. Authorization contract for access control
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noisserpxE : tcejbo -
][noisserpxE : stnemugra -
MemberExpression
noisserpxE : tcejbo -
dleiF : rebmem -
MethodCallExpession
noisserpxE : tcejbo -
noitarepO : noitarepo -
][noisserpxE : stnemugra -
nodeTypetype
children
parent
memberInits
LambdaParameterExpression
gnirts : eman -
parameters
InvokeExpression
noisserpxE : tcejbo -
][noisserpxE : stnemugra -
1
1
0..*
0..1
0..*
0..*
Fig. 10. Expressions
STS
WebShopClient
1. BuyWine()
5. Token+BuyWine()
2. ERROR: Token needed
6. OK
Fig. 11. WS-Trust sample
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Meta-class NodeType Description
UnaryExpression ArrayLength
Convert
Negate
Not
OnesComplement
TypeAs
UnaryPlus
An operation that obtains the length of a one-
dimensional array.
A type-conversion operation.
An arithmetic negation operation.
A bitwise complement or logical negation 
operation.
A ones complement operation.
An explicit type-conversion in which null is 
supplied if the conversion fails.
A unary plus operation.
BinaryExpression Add
Divide
Modulo
Multiply
Power
Subtract
And
Or
ExclusiveOr
LeftShift
RightShift
AndAlso
OrElse
Equal
NotEqual
GreaterThanOrEqual
GreaterThan
LessThan
LessThanOrEqual
Coalesce
ArrayIndex
An addition operation.
A division operation.
An arithmetic remainder operation.
A multiplication operation.
A mathematical operation that raises a 
number to a power.
A subtraction operation.
A bitwise or logical AND operation.
A bitwise or logical OR operation.
A bitwise or logical XOR operation.
A bitwise left-shift operation.
A bitwise right-shift operation.
A conditional AND operation that evaluates 
the second operand only if the first operand 
evaluates to true.
A conditional OR operation that evaluates 
the second operand only if the first operand 
evaluates to false.
A node that represents an equality 
comparison.
An inequality comparison.
A ”greater than or equal to” comparison.
A ”greater than” comparison.
A ”less than” comparison.
A ”less than or equal to” comparison.
A null coalescing operation.
An indexing operation in a one-dimensional 
array.
NewExpression
MemberInitExpression
NewArrayExpression
New
MemberInit
NewArrayInit
NewArrayBounds
An operation that calls a constructor to create
a new object. Fields can be initialized
by MemberInitExpressions.
Binds a value to a field of a composite type.
An operation that creates a new one-
dimensional array and initializes it from a list 
of elements.
An operation that creates a new array, in 
which the bounds for each dimension are 
specified.
TypeBinaryExpression TypeIs A type test.
ConditionalExpression Conditional A conditional operation with a then and an 
else branch.
LambdaExpression Lambda A lambda expression.
LambdaParameterExpression Parameter A lambda parameter.
ConstantExpression Constant A constant value.
DefaultExpression Default A default value.
IdentifierExpression Variable A variable reference.
IndexExpression Index An index operation.
MemberExpression MemberAccess An operation that references a field.
MethodCallExpression Call A method call.
InvokeExpression Invoke An operation that invokes a lambda 
expression.
Tab. 1. Node types of the expression tree
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namespace WineShoppingSample
{
  [Uri(“http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims”)]
  claims SampleClaims {
    DateTime BirthDate;
  }
  interface IWebShop {
    bool BuyWine();
  }
  authorization WebShopAuth : IWebShop {
    bool BuyWine() {
      requires SampleClaims.BirthDate;
      deny “Underage people cannot buy wine.” {
        DateTime.Now < SampleClaims.BirthDate.AddYears(18);
      }
      permit;
    }
  }
  binding WebShopBinding {
    transport HTTP;
    encoding SOAP;
    protocol WsAddressing;
    protocol WsSecurity {
      serverTokens { token WssX509Token; }
      clientTokens {
        token WssSamlToken {
          tokenIssuer Sts;
          claims SampleClaims.BirthDate;
        }
      }
    }
  }
  binding StsBinding {
    transport HTTP;
    encoding SOAP;
    protocol WsAddressing;
    protocol WsSecurity {
      tokens { token WssX509Token; }
    }
  }
  endpoint WebShop : IWebShop {
    binding WebShopBinding;
    authorization WebShopAuth;
    address “http://www.example.com/webshop/ws”;
  }
The SOAL code describing the system is the following (note 
that ISecurityTokenService is a pseudo interface iden-
tifying an STS):
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using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Web;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Claims;
using System.Threading;
A claim (Claim) has a name (end of the Uri in WS-Federa-
tion, AttributeName in SAML 1.1 and the end of Name in SAML 
2.0), a URI (start of the Uri in WS-Federation, AttributeNames-
pace in SAML 1.1 and the start of Name in SAML 2.0) and a type 
(none in WS-Federation, xsi:type in SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0).
In the above example the claim has the following attributes:
• name=BirthDate
• uri=http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims/
BirthDate
• type=DateTime
This claim is mapped to the different claims based identity 
standards as:
WS-Federation:
   <fed:ClaimType
         Uri=”http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims/BirthDate”>
   </fed:ClaimType>
SAML 1.1:
   <saml1:AttributeStatement>
     <saml1:Attribute AttributeName=”BirthDate”
        AttributeNamespace=”http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims”>
       <saml1:AttributeValue xsi:type=”xs:dateTime”>...</saml1:AttributeValue>
     </saml1:Attribute>
   </saml1:AttributeStatement>
SAML 2.0:
   <saml2:AttributeStatement>
     <saml2:Attribute
         Name=”http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims/BirthDate”
         FriendlyName=”BirthDate”>
     <saml2:AttributeValue xsi:type=”xs:dateTime”>...</saml2:AttributeValue>
     </saml2:Attribute>
  </saml2:AttributeStatement>
XACML Attribute:
  <xacml:Attribute IncludeInResult=”true”
     AttributeId=”http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims/BirthDate”>
      <xacml:AttributeValue DataType=”xs:dateTime”>...</xacml:AttributeValue>
  </xacml:Attribute>
  endpoint Sts : ISecurityTokenService {
    binding StsBinding;
    address “http://www.example.com/webshop/sts”;
  }
}
From the authorization WebShopAuth a C# class is gener-
ated, which is used as a decorator on the service class. This 
code provides the desired access control for the service:
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The code above retrieves the required BirthDate claim 
through the Windows Identity Foundation API, then it extracts 
the value of the claim and checks whether the condition for 
denial is met. If the condition is true, it throws an exception 
signaling an authorization error, otherwise it delegates the call 
to the actual implementation of the service.
The corresponding XACML code is the following:
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”utf-8”?>
<Policy xmlns=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os” 
    PolicyId=”BuyWinePolicy”
    RuleCombiningAlgId=
      “urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides”>
  <Target>
    <Subjects>
      <AnySubject/>
    </Subjects>
    <Resources>
      <ResourceMatch MatchId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal”>
        <AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string”>
namespace WineShoppingSample
{
    public class WebShopAuth : IWebShop
    {
        private IWebShop inner;
        public WebShopAuth(IWebShop
     inner)
        {
            this.inner = inner;
        }
        public bool BuyWine()
        {
            IClaimsPrincipal principal = IClaimsPrincipal)Thread.CurrentPrincipal;
            IClaimsIdentity identity = (IClaimsIdentity)principal.Identity;
            ClaimCollection claims = identity.Claims;
            Claim SampleClaims_BirthDate_Claim = claims.FirstOrDefault(
               c => c.ClaimType = SampleClaims.BirthDateClaimType);
            if (SampleClaims_BirthDate_Claim == null)
            {
                throw new Exception(string.Format(“Claim ‘{0}’ is required.”,
                   SampleClaims.BirthDateClaimType));
            }
            DateTime SampleClaims_BirthDate = 
                DateTime.Parse(SampleClaims_BirthDate_Claim.Value);
            if (DateTime.Now < SampleClaims_BirthDate.AddYears(18))
            {
                throw new Exception(“Underage people cannot buy wine.”);
            }
            return this.inner.BuyWine();
        }
    }
}
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The SOAL code in the above example is merely 47 lines 
long and it is easy to read. If the default values for the omitted 
parameters are not suitable for us, they can also be overrid-
den in the code. From this code our SOAL compiler builds a 
model as an instance of the SoaMM metamodel. This model 
is then used to generate WSDL, program code and configura-
tion files for the various SOA products. In addition, it couples 
these files together into projects, which can be directly opened 
in the SOA products, while only the application logic has to 
be implemented, that is, the body of the BuyWine() method. 
The projects then can be immediately deployed to the appro-
priate application servers.
It took only six lines to define the condition for the access 
control of the webshop web service in SOAL. The correspond-
ing XACML policy is a complex 49 lines long XML descrip-
tion, which is hard to write and maintain by hand. Although this 
XACML policy can be generated from models conforming to 
the SoaMM metamodel, a lot of SOA frameworks (e.g. Micro-
soft WCF) still have no support for XACML. Therefore, it is 
more useful to generate code for the specific frameworks, like 
the authorization class for C# in the above example, while the 
access control condition can be easily defined and maintained 
as a SOAL code.
           http://www.example.com/webshop/ws
         </AttributeValue>
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
            DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string”
            AttributeId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id”/>
      </ResourceMatch>
    </Resources>
    <Actions>
      <ActionMatch MatchId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal”>
        <AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string”>
          http://www.example.com/webshop/ws/BuyWine
        </AttributeValue>
        <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string”
               AttributeId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id”/>
      </ActionMatch>
    </Actions>
  </Target>
  <Rule RuleId=”BuyWineRule” Effect=”Deny”>
    <Target/>
    <Condition FunctionId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:dateTime-less-than”>
      <Apply FunctionId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only”>
        <EnvironmentAttributeSelector 
          DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime”
          AttributeId=”urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-dateTime”/>
      </Apply>
      <Apply
         FunctionId=
           “urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:dateTime-add-yearMonthDuration”>
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
          DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string”
          AttributeId=”http://www.example.com/webshop/SampleClaims/BirthDate”/>
        <AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime”>
          18Y
        </AttributeValue>
      </Apply>
    </Condition>
  </Rule>
  <Rule RuleId=”FinalRule” Effect=”Permit”/>
</Policy>
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In addition, the WS-Policy assertions for the WebShop 
service and for the Sts security token service are themselves 
longer than the entire SOAL code above. The corresponding 
WSDL is 172 lines long, and our framework even generates 
product specific configuration files and source code, too. This 
means that it is easier to describe and configure distributed 
SOA systems through SOAL than to do it manually. In addi-
tion, our code generator ensures that the configurations of the 
different SOA products will conform to each other, therefore, 
the web services implemented in different SOA products will 
be able to communicate with each other immediately.
5 Evaluation
This section evaluates our SoaMM metamodel, SOAL lan-
guage and the framework built around them. Our aim is to 
provide interoperability between SOA products without inter-
fering with their operation. Our framework is only for offline 
use, that is, generating source code and configuration files. Our 
framework does not extend the SOA products and it does not 
provide any runtime components either. Hence, this evaluation 
only covers development productivity and does not deal with 
runtime performance issues.
We have examined every detail of the WS-* standards and 
created sample applications with interoperable configurations 
in the various SOA products for the WS-* standards. The prod-
ucts under examination were Microsoft WCF, GlassFish ESB, 
Oracle SOA Suite, IBM WebSphere with RAD, Apache Axis2, 
Apache CXF and JBossWS. As a result, we have an extensive 
overview of the peculiarities of the individual SOA products, 
and we could use these experiences we gained to construct 
a platform independent metamodel above all WS-* standards 
and SOA products. The end result is the SoaMM metamodel 
described in Section 3. There has not yet been such a compre-
hensive metamodel published until now.
Our proposed SoaMM metamodel and SOAL program-
ming language provides a platform independent description 
of claims-based access control for distributed systems of web 
services. This platform independent description is transformed 
into WSDL files, configuration files, program code and projects 
for the various SOA products by our code generator. The code 
generator makes sure that the produced projects are directly 
openable in the targeted SOA products and they are immedi-
ately deployable to the appropriate application servers, while 
they are also interoperable with each other even between differ-
ent products of different software vendors. The code generator 
currently supports Microsoft WCF and GlassFish ESB, how-
ever, other products are planned to be supported, too.
As the example in the previous section showed, the proposed 
SOAL programming language provides a compact, easily read-
able and maintainable description of a distributed system built 
from web services. Security protocols are easy to configure 
even if WS-Federation and SAML are present. This can be ben-
eficial for setting up security in grid systems, too.
The true power of our framework came out in another pro-
ject we are currently working on. The project is about measur-
ing and predicting the overhead of using different parameter 
types (int, double, string, etc.) and different WS-* standards for 
web services in the various SOA products. This task required 
a large number of web services to be implemented in differ-
ent combinations of types and WS-* standards and SOA prod-
ucts. As a result, 280 web services had to be implemented per 
SOA product. The performance overhead is measured not only 
within a single SOA product but between different SOA prod-
ucts as well. This would not be possible without this framework 
described in this article.
Another application of our framework was a pilot project for 
the Hungarian e-Government Infrastructure, where a real-life 
public administration process (foundation of a private entre-
preneurship) had to be implemented using web services and 
BPEL. The pilot system included the simulation of four gov-
ernment agencies. There were seven web services, a BPEL pro-
cess and a web site in the pilot system. At first, the implementa-
tion of the process and the services was done manually, and it 
took about 1 month to complete. We published our results and 
the detailed description of the pilot system in [26]. After our 
framework was ready, we reimplemented all the services by 
specifying them in SOAL at first, and then we generated WSDL 
files, program code and configuration files for the various SOA 
products we had to use. In this second round we also included 
the test system of the real Hungarian Electronic Governmen-
tal Portal in the pilot system. This second approach took three 
days, which shows, that our framework can greatly increase 
productivity in the development of distributed SOA systems.
Table 2 shows the productivity of the framework based on 
the previous examples. For each application the number of 
lines is listed for the SOAL source code and also for the gen-
erated artefacts (XSD+WSDL, C# code, .NET configuration, 
Java code, Netbeans configuration, and the total number of 
generated lines, respectively). It can be seen from the examples 
how compact SOAL is compared to the configurations of the 
Application SOAL WSDL C# .NET config Java NB config Total gen.
STS example 39 172 241 53 199 1566 2231
WS-* performance test 2168 56276 22083 8927 29806 18118 135210
Hungarian e-Gov pilot 146 614 917 233 1642 2026 5432
Tab. 2. Productivity of the framework with different examples in number of lines
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SOA products. Changing the service descriptions in SOAL and 
regenerating the source code and configuration files is more 
productive than keeping the program code and configurations 
in sync by hand for each of the various SOA products.
6 Conclusion
Our goal was to provide a top-down development method for 
distributed systems of web services with WS-* protocols. This 
goal was inspired by the fact that the different SOA products 
provide different methods for configuring web services making 
it difficult to match the various configuration options between 
SOA products. Although WS-Policy assertions provide a plat-
form independent way for configuration, they are hard to con-
struct and to maintain manually. Setting up security and access 
control is also a tedious task. Therefore, we proposed a more 
intuitive modeling approach.
UML itself is not suitable for modeling web service stand-
ards, since it lacks most of the concepts required to describe 
these elements. Although by using stereotypes the task can be 
managed, WS-* protocols cannot be modeled easily. Semantic 
web service technologies are not designed for modeling either. 
Therefore, we proposed a domain specific language for mod-
eling distributed systems of web services.
In this article we presented an extension to our SoaMM meta-
model for describing claims-based access control in a platform 
independent way. We also created a programming language 
called SOAL to describe models in a textual concrete syntax. 
We have carefully examined the WS-* standards and the SOA 
products implementing them to be able to construct a truly plat-
form independent metamodel for modeling web services. There 
has not yet been such a comprehensive metamodel for claims-
based access control for web services published until now.
The framework built around the metamodel contains a com-
piler from SOAL to SoaMM models, and a code generator to 
produce configuration files and program code for the various 
SOA products. Only the application logic has to be imple-
mented, and the projects can be immediately deployed to the 
appropriate application servers. The framework primarily aids 
the top-down development of distributed systems. From the 
compact, easily readable and maintainable SOAL descriptions 
it can produce hundreds of configuration files and program code 
for the SOA products. As it was mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, the framework can be powerful, if a large number of inter-
operable web services have to be created. The development time 
of such distributed systems can also be greatly reduced.
We will extend the framework with XACML reverse engi-
neering capabilities so that the descriptions of already exist-
ing systems can also be imported into the framework. Another 
future direction is to support other advanced access control fea-
tures (e.g. obligations in XACML), too.
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